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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

medicinal, etc. Thus the state law is superseded. Upon a further
strict construction of this act,3 5 it might be held that if North Carolina,
for instance, should so modify its prohibition laws as to permit the
importation and sale of beverages which might qualify in law as intoxicating liquors (e.g., beer of greater than 3.2 per centum alcohol),
the importation of same would be prohibited by the Reed Amendment
unless the manufacture as well as sale thereof were made lawful. It
is noteworthy that the Twenty-first Amendment in contrast merely
prohibits the transportation or importation into the state for use or
delivery therein of intoxicating liquors "in violation of the laws thereof." Since there is now a strong constitutional guarantee of protection
against the transportation into dry states contrary to the laws of those
states, the Reed Amendment might well be repealed. In the event of such
repeal, the dry states would again be able to have a modified form of
prohibition (e.g., permitting the bringing in, and possession of, small
quantities for personal use) without subjecting their citizens to punishment for a federal offense contrary to the spirit of the Twenty-first
Amendment.
THOMAs H. LEATH.

Constitutional Law-Validity of Municipal Ordinance Excluding
Personal Sureties in Requirement of Bond for Operation
of Taxicabs.
As a condition precedent to the operation of public service automobiles on the streets of Charlotte, North Carolina, an ordinance required the deposit with the treasurer of the city of either liability
insurance with a responsible company authorized to do business in the
state, or cash or securities in lieu thereof.' In a recent case the jury
found that the defendant had met all state and municipal requirements
for the operation of taxicabs, except compliance with the ordinance.!
The trial court's verdict of not guilty of any offense was affirmed by
the supreme court on the ground that since the ordinance made no provision for bonds with personal sureties, it was unconstitutional, in that
869 (W. D. La. 1919).
'An ordinance to regulate the operation of cabs, taxicabs, and for-hire cars,
' United States v. Collins, 254 Fed.

adopted by the city of Charlotte, October 27, 1933 :-"Section one: No. person,
firm, or corporation shall operate. . . cabs, taxicabs, or for-hire cars.. . upon the
streets of Charlotte... unless (A) said operators shall have filed with the treasurer of the city of Charlotte... policies of liability insurance with a responsible
company authorized to do business in North Carolina, indemnifying licensees...
(in stated sums)... in any action wherein said driver may be held liable. (B)
In lieu, of such insurance, . . .operators may- deposit like amounts... in cash or
securities.' Section two prescribes penalties.
2State v. Sasseen, 206 N. C. 644, 175 S. E. 142 (1934).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
it tended to create "separate emoluments" and "monopolies" by turning
the surety business to companies. 3 The court agreed with the contention of the defendant that the ordinance conflicted with a statute which
showed the legislative intent to allow personal sureties, but it declined
to use that ground as a basis for the decision.4
From other jurisdictions there is practically no authority in accord
with the instant decision; 5 and the only North Carolina case cited by
the court in support of its holding is clearly distinguishable. 6 In the
principal case the court takes the position that the municipal ordinance,
since it excludes individual sureties, is unconstitutional because it accords special privileges to surety companies by giving them business
denied personal sureties. 7 But in the case cited to sustain this view, a
statute applicable only to Buncombe County8 is held unconstitutional because building contractors were required to file bonds, executed by
'The court said the ordinance violated the following: N. C. CONST. Art 1,
§7 ("No men or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments
or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services") ; id.
§31 ("Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state
and ought not to be allowed") ; id. §29 ("A frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty").
'The defendant claimed the ordinance contravened N. C. Laws 1931, c. 116
("An act to promote safe driving on the highways and to force the collection of
judgments against irresponsible drivers of motor vehicles." The act makes no
distinction between operators of private and of public service vehicles. It provides that failure of any operator of an automobile to pay tort judgments
within thirty days after rendition authorizes suspension of drivers license until
said judgments are satisfied, or until said operator gives proof of ability to
respond in damages as to future accidents, said proof of ability to respond as to
future accidents to consist of the deposit of a bond with surety company or with
"two individual sureties.") Though the court agrees with the defendant, it says,
"We are not now called upon to decide whether the ordinance in question antagonizes the state law, and whether the state law covers the entire field."
I Infra notes 13, 14, and 15. The few cases in which parts of like ordinances
have been held invalid for any reason are clearly distinguishable: Jitney Bus Ass'n
v. City of Wilkes Barre, 256 Pa. 462, 100 Atl. 954 (1917) (wherein the ordinance
was held unreasonable in so far as it required continuing liability of obligors
after payment of the full sum set out in the bond, and provided only for corporate
sureties although there was proof that they could not be secured without tremendous difficulty) ; State v. Dillon, 82 Fla. 276, 89 So. 558 (1921) (where ordinance
was held unconstitutional because of the continuing liability objection). However, in People v. Martin, 203 App. Div. 423, 197 N. Y. S.28 (1922), an ordinance
requiring continuing liability in the bond was upheld.
' Plott v. Ferguson, 202 N. C. 446, 163 S.E. 688 (1932). Only this case is
cited to support the contention of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance, on
which ground alone the decision rests. The court refers to two other decisions on
this point, but only as dicta: Fleming v. Asheville, 203 N. C. 810, 167 S.E. 77
(1933) ; s. c. 205 N. C. 765, 172 S.E. 362 (1934).
'See supra, note 3.
8 N. C. Laws 1927, c. 613 (Providing that in Buncombe County, if private
builders required bonds from contractors, said bonds must contain a provision
saving the builder harmless, must be executed with corporate sureties, and must
include provisions required by N. C. Laws 1927, c. 151 relative to bonds covering
municipal building by towns and cities.) (N. C. Laws 1927, c. 151 provides that
the surety on the bond contracts not only to indemnify the creditor against loss,
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surety companies, which in Buncombe County imposed obligations on
such surety companies and granted privileges to the citizens of that
county, not required of surety companies nor accorded citizens of the
ninety-nine other counties of the state.0
The general rule that in the exercise of the police power, cities and
states can impose reasonable regulations upon the operation of vehicles
for hire is based on the principle that a person -has no inherent right to
use the public streets for private business.10 Equally well founded is
the rule that in case of conflict between statute and ordinance relative
to the same subject, the statute of course will prevail ;"1 but municipal
requirements are not necessarily in conflict with those of the state merely
because the former are more stringent than the latter. 12 One of the
conditions precedent to the operation of public service vehicles which is
everywhere admitted to be reasonable is the requirement of a bond to
cover damages caused by negligence.' 3 And not only does the power
to require bond include the power to stipulate that it be issued by a
bonding company as surety, but also such requirement by ordinance or
statute is not unconstitutional because it fails to provide for any other
kind of surety.' 4 Nor will the fact that the operators of vehicles for
but also to guarantee payment for labor and materials furnished under the building contract).
'Supra,note (8). N. C. Laws 1927, c. 151 was held invalid because in effect
it provided that corporate sureties in Buncombe County, irrespective of the contract of indemnity, must, in private construction work, not only hold the creditor'
harmless, but also see laborers and materialmen paid. This placed a burden on
corporate sureties in Buncombe not borne by the same kind of sureties in other
counties, hence violating both due process, by impairment of freedom of contract, and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Federal constitution.
It also gave laborers and materialmen in Buncombe separate emoluments and
privileges not enjoyed by the citizens of other counties, hence violating the N. C.
CoxsT. Art 1, §7.

"'Huston v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 455, 156 N. W. 883 (1916) ; Harris
v. Atlantic City, 73 N. J.L. 251, 62 Atl. 995 (1906) (regulating wheel chairs for
hire on the streets) ; Dallas Taxicab Co. v. City of Dallas, 68 S. W. (2nd)' 359,
(Tex. 1934); 1 PoND, PuBLIC UTmlTiEs (4th. ed. 1932) §87.
'Ellington Co. v. City of Macon, 177 Ga. 541, 170 S.E. 813 (1933) ; Denny
v. Brady, 201 Ind. 59, 163 N. E. 489 (1928) ; North Star Line v. City of Grand
Rapids, 259 Mich. 654, 244 N. W. 192 (1932). However, there is a strong presumption that the city ordinance is consistent with the state law; hence to invalidate
the ordinance, conflict with a statute must be clear and unmistakable.
U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Guenther, 281 U. S. 34, 50 Sup. Ct. 165, 74 L. ed. 683
(1929) ; Red Star Motors Ass'n v. Detroit, 244 Mich. 503, 221 N. W. 629 (1928).
Dallas Taxicab Co. v. City of Dallas, 68 S.W. (2nd) 359, (Tex. 1934).
1 State ex rel Dillon, 82 Fla. 276, 89 So. 558 (1921) ; Transylvania Cas. Ins.
Co. v. City of Atlanta, 35 Ga. App. 681, 134 S.E. 632 (1926).
" Lutz v. New Orleans, 235 Fed. 978 (E. D. La. 1916) ; Hester v. R. R Com.,
172 Ark. 90, 287 S.W. 763 (1926) ; Ex Parte Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150 Pac.
348 (1915) ; Sprout v. City of South Bend, 198 Ind. 563, 153 N. E. 504 (1926) ;
Fletcher v. Bordelon, 56 S.W. (2nd) 313 (Tex. 1933) ; State v. Seattle Taxi Co.,
90 Wash. 416, 156 Pac. 837 (1916) (These decisions are all flatly contra to the
instant case); 2 Bmaay, A TOMOBILmES (6th. ed. 1929) §1966; 1 BLASHnELD,
CycLoIEr. OF AUTOMOBLE LAW (1st. ed. 1927) 157.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
hire are unable to provide such bond invalidate the statute or
ordinance. 15
The argument of the court that the exclusion of individual sureties
makes the ordinance unconstitutional is entirely untenable because no
particular groups of people nor specific companies are chosen to enjoy
the surety business under grants of "separate emoluments" or "monopolies," but the ordinance simply makes reasonable classifications for the
protection of the public.' 6 Furthermore, important North Carolina
statutes, requiring bonds issued by companies or corporations as sureties, and making no provisions for individual sureties, have never been
held unconstitutional by the supreme court.' 7 Although there is just
as much reason for condemning these statutes as for holding void the
ordinance in the principal case, yet, in view of the weight of authority
on the subject, it is believed the supreme court will construe the statutes
to be valid.' 8
The contention that the ordinance conflicts with the statute, though
not used as a basis for the instant decision, is also unsound, both be-

cause the subject matter is not identical, and because even if it were,
the mere fact that the ordinance is more stringent than the statute,
would not alone make the former invalid.' 9
Also for practical considerations the present holding is to be re21New Orleans v. Le Blanc, 139 La. 113, 71 So. 248 (1915); Puget Sound
v. Grassmeyer, 102 Wash. 482, 173 Pac. 504 (1918).
"Hester v. Arkansas R. R Comn, 172 Ark. 90, 287 S. W. 763 (1926); ex

Parte Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150 Pac. 348 (1915), cited supra note 14, (wherein
the court, in upholding an ordinance that excluded personal sureties from bonds,
said 'We know of no constitutional right that one has to give any particular
kind of surety"). In the instant case, since the ordinance allows any and all
persons who are willing to meet the requirements set for becoming surety
companies to enjoy the surety business, there is nothing exclusive about the ordinance.
7
N . C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §218 (c) (Requiring the commissioner of
banks to file bond executed by surety company as surety thereon) ; id.§221 (m)
(the same as to bank employees) ; id. §225 (j) (the same as to employees of industrial banks) ; id. §323 (a) (same relative to bonds from officials of the state).
See: Guaranty Co. v. Hood, Comr. of Banks, 206 N. C. 639, 175 S. E. 135, (1934)
(wherein the constitutionality of N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1334 (70),
requiring bonds with surety companies to the exclusion of personal sureties seems
to be taken for granted).
=Snpra notes 14 and 15; Dallas Taxicab Co. v. City of Dallas, 68 S. W. (2nd)
359 (Tex. 1934).
" Cases cited by the court to sustain its argument do present instances of clear
conflicts: State v. Taylor, 88 N. C. 692 (1883) (Wherein a statute which removed
from the jurisdiction of the city cognizance of the crime of selling liquor on
Sunday, was held to be contravened by an ordinance giving the city jurisdiction
of that crime) ; State v. Stallings, 189 N. C. 104, 126 S. E. 187 (1925) (holding an
ordinance void because it required drivers to stop at intersections, irrespective of
traffic conditions, in the face of a statute which allowed drivers to cross at ten
miles per hour). But in the instant case there is no conflict, because the ordinance merely regulates public service automobiles as such, concerning which
subject the statute makes no attempt to deal. See notes 1 and 4, Yupra.
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gretted, because (a) in the interests of the public it is desirable that
public service vehicles be more strictly regulated than private vehicles ;20 (b) under the general law applicable to all automobile drivers
alike, it is possible for injured parties to be entirely unable to collect
amounts awarded by any judgments for "first offenses" rendered
against operators of for-hire vehicles ;21 (c) in view of the corporate
surety's greater responsibility, and of the power of the creditor to sue
such surety directly, the desireability of corporate over individual sureties is recognized in business and law.22
JoE L. CARLToN.
Contracts Induced by Fraud-Election of Remedies in Noth
Carolina.
A plaintiff who has been induced to enter a contract through fraud
of the defendant is faced with the perplexing problem of making a choice
of remedies. From the point of view of selection of rights he may affirm
the contract or may rescind. If he chooses the former, his remedy is
an action on the contract or an action for deceit. But if he chooses the
latter, his remedy is to seek a restoration of the status quo, by bringing
a bill for rescission or suing at law on the basis of a complete rescission.1
Thus, the plaintiff is faced with a choice between two inconsistent positions in regard to his substantive rights. In practical effect this usually
means an election between the two remedies already mentioned. To this
situation is applied the much discussed doctrine of election of remedies with the result that the choice of one among inconsistent remedies
bars recourse to others.2 It has been pointed out 8 that the historical
evolution of this doctrine has proceeded in at least three stages: first,
a period in which the doctrine was applied for the recognized purpose
of preventing a double satisfaction; second, a period in which the doctrine was cast in terms of formal logic and its real purpose overlooked
in the following of logical consistencies; and third, a period in which, it
being recognized that logical consistency as an end in itself often led
'See: Eastern Ohio Transportation Corp. v. Village of Bridgeport, 44 Ohio

App. 433, 185 N. E. 891 (1932) ; Notes 10 and 14 supra.
'Comment,

(1931) 9 N. C. L. REv. 384; see note 4, .supra.

Lutz v. New Orleans, 235 Fed. 978 (E. D. La. 1916) ; NATIONAL BAN urarCY
AcT, §50, Bonds of trustees and referees: 30 STAr. 558 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §78
(1927).
'Day v. Broyles, 222 Ala. 508, 133 So. 269 (1931) ; Fields v. Brown, 160 N. C.
295, 76 S. E. 8 (1912) (If rescission does not restore the status quo, damages may
be a cumulative and not an inconsistent remedy).
'United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct. 100, 67 L. ed.
261 (1922); Gutterman v. Gally, 131 Cal. App. 647, 21 Pac. (2d) 1000 (1933);
Deinard and Deinard, Election of Remedies (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv. 341; Hines,
Election of Remedies, A Criticism (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 707.
'Note (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 593.

